Philosophical understanding of schizophrenia
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.55414/jfzq0e73Keywords:
Phenomenology, Crisis of Common Sense, Hyper-reflexivity, Negative Symptoms, Hallucination, DelusionAbstract
Among approaches to schizophrenia, the philosophical perspective has every right to be taken into account. Current neuropsychological theories have yet to provide a sound explanation, after more than 100 years, including the Decade of the Brain. And worse still, they no longer even set out to offer an understanding. So we are left with neither an explanation nor an understanding. But without an attempt to comprehend the experience and behaviour involved in the disorder called ‘schizophrenia’, there is scarce likelihood of achieving an explanation worthy of being called ‘scientific’ (however well dressed up in the clothing of scientific forms). The understanding we propose here takes up the phenomenological tradition, in accordance with the new developments that, in spite of the dominant tendencies, continue to be active in psychiatry and clinical psychology. Schizophrenia is reappraised as a disorder basically affecting self-awareness and common sense. Thus, we apply a phenomenological approach to the negative symptoms, hallucinations and delusions. Bearing in mind, naturally, the consideration of schizophrenia as a unitary concept (not a set of symptoms), albeit variable in its form.Downloads
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